An independent investigation and analysis of the Đồng-Tâm incident by Dr Hoàng Xuân Phú, published in February, 2020. My translation only seeks to provide English readers with some background information on this complex multiple-murder case. I neither agree nor disagree with the author’s opinions and conclusions herein. It is up to the reader to decide. This translation is a work in progress and will likely get edited and updated over time as more information is revealed during the trial of the 29 villagers in September; you are welcome to share it as long as you include this Note and a link back to this page for the latest updates. -ianbui (vietopian.wordpress.com)
The three police officers killed in action were: Lt Col. Nguyễn Huy Thịnh, 1st Lt Phạm Công Huy, and 2nd Lt. Dương Đức Hoàng Quân. Their heroic status was lauded loudly by leaders and spread widely by the press. But would these policemen have been so proud of their sacrifice?
We’re told 2nd Lt. Dương Đức Hoàng Quân had once written: “Going to war to defend your country is not scary. But it would be scary to kill your own people.” If it’s true he wrote that, then it’s hard to imagine him being proud about getting himself killed while attacking his own people at Đồng Tâm.
1. An unusual decision
On January 10, 2020, President Nguyễn Phú Trọng signed order 41/QĐ-CTN which honored the three officers killed at Đồng Tâm with first-class medals normally reserved for combat actions (Photo 16). As for himself, the president also set three new records.
The first was record time: This order was signed just one day after the three men were martyred (1/9/2020). That’s four times faster than the amount of time it took for the former President Trần Đại Quang to give a 2nd class medal to Police Lt Lưu Minh Thức, on February 21, 2018, for dying in the line of duty chasing after a murder suspect on February 14th. And three times as fast as the time Vice-president Nguyễn thị Doan took to give a Combat Medal of Honor to the servicemen who died or were injured in the Mi-171 crash on July 7, 2014.
From a logical standpoint, it should take some time to carefully consider the circumstances around the deaths, determine the cause as well as the bravery in combat of the recipients. It would not be appropriate to give medals to someone who either did not follow proper procedures or did not follow battlefield orders. Yet in this case the three men had died just one day earlier, on January 9, but already they were given combat medals of combat, even before Vice Prime Minister Trương Hoà Bình had the chance to sign order 70/QĐ-TTg on January 11 giving these three men certificates of “Eternal Thanks from a Grateful Nation”.
The second is a record of generosity: All three men in the 1st lieutenant and 2nd lieutenant ranks were given first-class honors. Note that even Lt. Lưu Minh Thức only got a 2nd class medal. As for the 18 service men killed in the Mi-171 incident, only three received the highest medal of honor for their service, and only two received a 3rd class medal. The rest of the team only got 3rd placeclass medals. It seems incredulous that raiding a citizen’s home at night somehow merits higher value than capturing murderers or defending the nation.
The third record is about getting ahead of oneself: In the order 41/QĐ-CTN signed on January 10, 2020, Ppresident Nguyễn Phú Trọng referred to Lt. Col. Nguyễn Huy Thịnh as a Colonel; 2nd Lt. Dương Đức Hoàng Quân as 1st Lieutenant; and 1st Lt. Phan Công Huy as 2nd Lieutenant (Photo 17). It wasn’t until one day later that the Minister of Security signed the order promoting them.
But it did not stop there. One day later Dương Đức Hoàng Quân was promoted again, to Senior Lieutenant, and Phạm Công Huy was promoted to Captain. Thus two low-ranking officers were promoted twice when typically those who die in combat only get promoted one rank. Why is that?
2. Effectiveness of the sacrifice
Why were the deaths of these three policemen called “combat actions of exemplary note”?
Imagine what the public reaction would have been if no policemen died after the brutal killing of Mr Kình. Obviously the public would denounce the savage police act as trampling on the Constitution and the law.
If only one man died, that would not have been enough to assuage the public. But with three dead policemen the story would be very different.
If only a 1st and 2nd lieutenant were killed, that might be ridiculed as ineptitude or lack of experience. But if a senior lieutenant second in command of a riot police unit is killed, it would be harder to blame these deaths on incompetence.
And if they died from bullets or mines, it probably would invoke only sympathy. But a horrific burning death (Photo 19) would cause millions to really hate Mr Kình and the people of Đồng Tâm. Such a level of public outrage would overcome any questions about the legality of the extrajudicial killing of Citizen Kình.
What I’m trying to say is that the deaths of these officers helped the authorities right a wrong. Not only could they avoid being denounced by the public, they would even receive a lot of sympathy.
With such effectiveness, no wonder their sacrifice was called “combat actions of exemplary note.”
3. A Strange way to die
After propagating several fantastic tales of how and where these policemen died, on January 14 Vice Minister of Security Lương Tam Quang gave reporters the following account:
“The suspects first ran into Lê Đình Chức’s house, pursued by our men. They then ran to Lê Đình Hợi’s house. During the chase from Chức’s house to Hợi’s house, there was a fairly deep “air venting hole”, about 4 meters deep ,that our men fell into. Someone has reported that the well was booby trapped; that is not true. It was just a venting well without a cover. Like those you might have seen in gas explosion accidents. Immediately, the suspects poured gasoline down the hole and burned our men.”
Why did all three policemen fall down the hole in such a manner?
Some people have suggested that perhaps the police did not do a thorough job scouting the area so they didn’t know that the vent hole was there. But saying that is really an insult to the capabilities of the Ministry of Security. During the war, our fighting men learned to climb over multiple layers of barbed wires full of mines to spy on the enemy. How difficult would it be to check on somebody’s house in the middle of a peacetime neighborhood? And even if they couldn’t monitor from nearby houses, they still could use simple devices to watch from afar.
I took this panoramic photo (Photo 20) while standing near this vent hole. Every landmark I was able to see from this viewpoint is a possible vantage point from which the police could have seen the vent hole. Or one could just use a simple drone to fly over the area and map out exactly where everything is on the top level of Mr Kình’s house, including the vent hole. Therefore, the people who drew up the attack plan could easily have known about that hazard.
Others have suggested that the three officers must have fallen in because it was too dark and they were not equipped with flashlights. That’s like accusing the leadership of being both irresponsible and corrupt – misappropriating funds that should have been spent on equipping our fighting forces with the tools they need to do their job.
In reality, it wasn’t very dark at all when the attack took place; bright light was beamed directly at the target. Furthermore, its surrounding areas were never clouded by smoke. Photo 21 is clear evidence of that. This photo is a screen capture (at minute 00:31) of a news show on VTV and was shared by multiple newspapers. For instance, the Vietnamnet article headlined “Grenades and petrol bombs found, Đồng Tâm suspects rounded up for public disturbances”, or “Storyline of the Đồng Tâm incident: suspects captured” from Đất Việt.
One only needs to compare Photo 21 with the area surrounding the vent hole in daylight (Photo 22) to see that the policemen surely must have seen the hazard. And yet they still fell into it, and their actions were subsequently lauded as “combat actions of exemplary note”. In other words, the effectiveness of their sacrifice was valued higher that the actual quality of their fighting skills.
In fact, the police force should have seriously learned from their errors in order to prevent similar fatal mistakes in the future. Contrariwise, following the request of Prime Minister Nguyễn Xuân Phúc, the Party high commissioner for the Police, the Riot Police Headquarters, the Police’s own Fire Department as well as the Police forces in the surrounding provinces all participated in a campaign to learn to emulate the three deceased men.
What is there to learn? The proper technique to fall into a pit? No, the lesson that’s needed is not about fighting techniques but an attitude of accepting orders when being sacrificed.
This goes to show that when the target of the armed forces that bear the People’s name is actually the people, then what those in power require of their officers and soldiers is not fighting skills but the ability to obey orders no matter how wrong they are, and the willingness to sacrifice one’s life even when the order is utterly immoral. Only then would they be able to point their guns at the people and at each other, ready to shoot on command.
By the time they reached the river Styx, those poor souls must have figured out the comical meaning of that trite phrase “If the Party survives, I will survive.” Because the Party indeed survived, but they surely didn’t.
4. Bizarre formation
According to Vice Minister Lương Tam Quang, “during the chase, a team of three men were martyred.” Those three men were:
- Sr Lt Col. Nguyễn Huy Thịnh, vice-leader of the Riot Police Regiment of the capital, belonging to the Riot Police Department of the Ministry of Security.
- 2nd Lt. Dương Đức Hoàng Quân of Battalion 1 of the Riot Police Regiment of the capital.
- 1st Lt. Phạm Công Huy of the Fire Brigade area 3, Fire Department of the Capital City Hanoi.
Why was there such an unusual combination of men on this particular team?
Where were the regiment leader and the battalion leader? Why was a vice-commander of a regiment put in charge of a soldier in a battalion? Where were the younger and more able men? Why was a 48-year-old Sr. Lt. Col. assigned to chase after a bunch of farmers on foot? Why was he not stationed on the perimeter to oversee the operation but made to pursue the suspects, only to fall into an vent hole?
And why was a fireman assigned to this chase team at all? Vice Minister Lương Tam Quang explained it thusly: “The reason a fireman was assigned to this team wais in case the suspects had petrol bombs and fire-causing materials…” Only the most obtuse person would believe such an explanation. Because the forces that came to Đồng Tâm certainly weren’t there out of compassion for the villagers; they didn’t come to help put out any potential fire. And of course the villagers wouldn’t be so foolish to set their own homes on fire to begin with.
Therefore, if the villagers needed to toss their petrol bombs (which in reality were nothing more than a few Hanoi Beer bottles filled with gasoline, see Photo 15) they would throw them toward the streets, which would most likely cause a few small fires that would eventually burn out anyway. There would not have been any need for a Fire Brigade. (One can review video clips of previous violent protests in the country to see that there never were any firefighting forces that came to put out fires caused by petrol bombs.)
Normally, firefighters stand outside the area of conflict and wait to see if there’s a fire before they go in. Moreover, a firefighter never goes in alone but with a team of other firefighters, as they always train and work together. So then one must ask why Phạm Công Huy was separated from his firefighting team and assigned to an assault team instead?
But it wasn’t just Phạm Công Huy. Dương Đức Hoàng Quân was similarly separated from his regular unit. So if something happened to him, none of his fellow officers would be nearby to help. That is why even though Huy had fallen before dawn, it wasn’t until the time of the exchange of command later in the day that his commander (Lt Col. Nguyễn Như Ý) learned of his death. At first he didn’t believe the news; he had to call several other commanders to confirm that his subordinate had died. In other words, at the time of his death none of Huy’s teammates from the Area 3 Fire Brigade was around.
It is hard to find a feasible explanation for why such an unusual three-man team was formed. But if one looks at it from an angle of sacrifice and promoting outrage, then this formation had several advantages.
First, a team of three men who hardly knew each other would not be very cohesive or well-coordinated. They wouldn’t have a strong sense of camaraderie and therefore would be easier to sacrifice.
Second, the life of a Senior Lt. Colonel certainly has a higher sacrificial value than that of a lower ranking officer. Thus the amount of outrage generated would be much higher as well. Not only that, before they die, senior officers can be given orders that are more classified in nature, something a more junior officer can’t be trusted with.
Third, a firefighter is trained to fight fires and save lives in situations that are more civilian in nature. But when they themselves are a target for killing, it would be harder for them to defend themselves. Furthermore, firefighters sometimes have to bring with them materials that can potentially cause fire to themselves and others, similar to the situation described in an article by Trung Hiếu titled “Đồng Tâm: Soldiers burned in 1000-degree heat?”
5. Search for the killer
Some of the reasoning in this section is based on the following two premises:
Premise 1: All three men were burned to death in the vent hole between the homes of Lê Đình Chức and Lê Đình Hợi.
Premise 2: The burned corpse in Photo 18 and the two piles of ashes in Photo 19 are their remains.
Of course, if one or both of these premises are false then the conclusion based on these premises will be incorrect as well. However, there is reason to believe that they are true.
On the one hand, premise 1 is consistent with the statement by Vice Minister of Police Lương Tam Quang on January 14: “Between Lê Đình Chức’s house and Lê Đình Hợi’s house there is a deep air vent hole, about 4 meters deep. Our men fell into it… Immediately, the suspects threwused the petrol bombs and poured gasoline into the hole and burned them.”
On the other hand, both premises 1 and 2 are also consistent with the crime scene as shown in Photo 18 and Photo 19. In Photo 18 we see a burned body that had just been pulled up from the air hole. In Photo 19 we see two piles of ashes near the air hole. If that’s all then it would be difficult to determine what kind of ashes they are. But if we look closely, we see that there are three jossticks burning, and one josstick each on the two piles of ashes. This indicates that the ashes belong to dead persons. Furthermore, a closer examination of the vent hole in Photo 24 and the ladder in Photo 25, we see traces of fallen ashes on them. This indicates that the ashes were brought up from the air hole. Also, the policemen in the photo can be seen setting up a makeshift altar with fruits and flowers for their fallen comrades.
There are two questions that need to be answered:
1) Why did the three men fall into the vent hole?
2) Who burned them , and how?
Circumstantial Clause #1: Đồng Tâm villagers did not push the men into the vent hole
Vice Minister Lương Tam Quang said “Our men fell into the hole.” If that is true then we can directly verify that the first clause is also true. However, Mr Quang’s statement will be refuted by our Circumstantial Clause #2. Therefore we can only apply his statement indirectly. Assuming that he’d made a false statement, in his role of vice minister of the Ministry of Security – the department responsible for drawing up the assault plan against Đồng Tâm and directing its execution, Mr Quang surely must know what had taken place. Therefore, the fact that Mr Quang never accused the suspects of pushing the men into the hole, even though he did accuse them of using “petrol bombs and , poured gasoline down the holes and burned [the soldiers]” is proof that the villagers never pushed the men down the vent hole.
But then again, we don’t even need to rely on that assumption at all because of the following: The riot police were fully armed with modern weapons ready to fire at any time; the villagers on the other hand had no guns, thus they would never be able to get close enough to push all three men down the vent hole. The pock marks on the wall of Mr Kình’s home (photos 2 through 7), on the wall of Mr Lê Đình Công’s home (photo 23), and on the upper balcony of Mr Lê Đình Chức’s home (photo 26) clearly show that the police were not trying to spare bullets. It would have been impossible for the villagers to even venture outside, much less confront those trigger-happy soldiers head on.
Circumstantial Clause #2: It’s impossible for the three police officers to all fall into the same vent hole.
We shall base our reasoning on close observation of the window above the vent hole. The reasoning may be long, and the proof will be presented after Circumstantial Clause #4, but it is a conclusion that many people will also be able to discern.
As was written in section 3, when the assault took place, the area around the vent hole was NOT dark, nor was it obscured by smoke. Therefore the three men must have seen the vent hole. But let’s suppose for a moment that they didn’t see it.
Let’s first take a look at the direction in which the men were moving, as reported by Trịnh Bá Phương: “On January 9, riot police broke down the front door of Mr Hợi’s house. They then climbed onto the 2nd floor. From there they broke the window of Mr Hợi’s house and jumped over to the balcony of Mr Chức’s house.” Note that the breaking window detail matches with photo 18 which shows the window being broken. In this situation, photo 24 with three men standing behind the window indicates that there’s simply not enough space for all three soldiers to stand shoulder to shoulder looking toward the vent hole. In fact, the window is only 80cm wide. Therefore it would not be possible for all three soldiers to climb through the window at the same time. There are only two ways to get through this window:
- Stand with one foot on the floor and the other leg draped over the ledge. This would only make sense if they thought Mr Chức’s house was immediately adjacent to Mr Hợi’s, that is, they had no idea that there was even an vent hole behind the window.
- Climb up and stand with both legs on the ledge, at the same time use both arms to hold on to the sides and then jump down.
With either method, only one person would fit the width of the window. Meaning, only one person would be able to go through at a time. If the first person had fallen down while trying, he would have screamed and that would have stopped the other two from proceeding.
Note also that if one stands on the window ledge, which is about 85cm higher than the balcony level of Mr Chức’s house, it is quite easy to clear the 77cm width of the vent hole to land on the other side.
Now let’s take a look at the case of movement in the opposite direction, as Vice Minister Quang reported: “We chased the suspects from Lê Đình Chức’s house to the house of Lê Đình Hợi.” That is, jump from Mr Chức’s balcony, over the vent hole, into Mr Hợi’s window. This scenario is much less likely because it would not have been easy to clear the 77cm width of the vent hole AND go up 85cm to the window’s opening (see photos 24 and 25). Furthermore, on the night of the assault, this window was closed (which is why there are signs of its having been broken through in photo 18). Therefore, it would not have been possible for the villagers to try to escape in that direction, and there would have been no reason for the police to chase after them in that direction. But even if that did occur, for whatever reason, it still would not be possible for all three men to jump over the air hole at the same time because only one man would have been able to jump through that 80cm-wide opening at a time. Again, had one of them failed and fallen into the hole, his scream would have caused the other two to back off.
In short, in both scenarios, there was no way that all three men could have fallen into the vent hole together.
In reality, the top level of Mr Chức’s house is actually adjacent to Mr Hợi’s balcony (photo 26). One only needs to climb over the balcony itself (left side of photo 26) and be done. The same goes in the reverse direction. That area is only a few meters from the vent hole. Therefore it would make no sense for any chase to go over the vent hole itself. In other words, the pursuit of the suspects is not the real reason why the three policemen came to the vent hole to have their lives ended there.
Circumstantial Clause #3: The flammable material used to burn the three officers was not a liquid.
Assuming that the material was a liquid, then in order to burn someone to the degree seen in photos 18 and 19, it would have required an excessively large amount — large enough to evenly fill the bottom of the vent hole. The burning had to have been uniformly spread throughout on the bottom so that the heat could be evenly distributed within the four walls. And the soot mark on the walls had to have been fairly equal in height as well. Moreover, with such a large amount of liquid fuel burning inside a pit 415cm deep but quite narrow (77cmx138cm), and with several bodies burned to that degree, the height of the soot marks had to have been very high, and the color of the soot had to get lighter as it gets higher up the walls. And yet, looking at photos 27 and 28, we see just the opposite:
- The soot marks on the walls differ in height; it’s much bigger and higher on the left wall than on the other three.
- On the left wall there are several cracks that look brand new, whereas none of the other three walls shows any cracks, indicating that the left wall experienced much higher heat than the others.
- In some areas, the height of the soot mark is fairly low, and it stops abruptly instead of fading as it gets higher. That’s probably why some people who saw the vent hole directly remarked that there’s no sign of a fire.
This means that the material used to incinerate these men could not have been a liquid but some sort of powder, or perhaps a solid or a mix of both. That’s why it was not evenly distributed on the bottom of the air hole. The material must have been very powerful, creating an extreme heat that even though it burned in a relatively short time (not as long as liquid fuel would) yet still was enough to turn two men into ashes.
Circumstantial Clause #4: The accusation that Đồng Tâm villagers burned the three officers with petrol is fabrication.
Because petrol is a liquid, yet Clause #3 has determined that the substance used to incinerate the men could not have been a liquid, the accusation that the villagers burned these men with petrol cannot be true.
After having proven Clause #3, then affirming Clause #4 is just as simple. However, we shall take yet another route.
Following Clause #1, the villagers never pushed the men down the vent hole. And Clause #2 makes it clear it would not have been possible for the three men to fall into the hole at the same time. Yet, according to Premise #1 all three men were burned in the vent hole between Mr Chức’s and Mr Hợi’s house. That can only mean that someone had to have thrown them down into that hole. And in order for them to not resist, they had to have been neutralized beforehand. Since all three men were armed and trained to use their weapons, whoever killed them must have had to use a gun; that would be both quick and sure.
According to Premise #2, the burned corpse in photo 18 and the two piles of ashes in photo 19 are the remains of the three officers after being incinerated. Let’s call the first one in photo 18 X, the two in photo 19 Y and Z. It is quite clear that X still retained somewhat a human shape, whereas Y and Z were completely burned into ash. Burned in the same deep and narrow pit, 77cm x 138cm, they must have struggled and squirmed in the extreme heat, perhaps even toppling on each other. Yet photos 27 and 28 show that even the lowest point of the soot mark is not very low. Then why is there such a big discrepancy between the remains of the three bodies?
Clearly Y and Z were thrown in first. Only after they were sufficiently burned, when there was less of the substance left, that the third body was thrown in. That would explain why Y and Z were burned beyond recognition whereas X was not. Which means the killer must have stayed around after throwing Y and Z down before finishing the job with X. Obviously, the killer must have been armed such that no villager would dare come close at that time to pour any petrol into the pit to cause any fire.
This argument is also important in another respect; it retains the ability to refute in case the police change their story and accuse the villagers of using some powder mix (and not petrol) to burn the policemen.
The second line of reasoning in proving Clause #4 is useful for finding the real killer. What’s more, it also gives us a quick way to prove Clause #2.
If Clause #2 is wrong, i.e. all three men fell into the vent hole at the same time, then their bodies would have been burned fairly evenly. Thus if Y and Z were burned totally into ash then Z should have ended up in a somewhat similar state, or at least quite different from his human form. But this clearly contradicts what we see in photos 18 and 19. Therefore Clause #2 must be true.
In truth, after shooting the three policemen, the killer had to finish the job by burning their bodies beyond recognition to get rid of the evidence. Based on normal human psychology, Clause #4 also has to be true.
Still, some people might dismiss Clause #4 based on the following confession from Lê Đình Doanh, which VTV aired (see the video clip in an article posted by Vietnamnet titled “Gen Lương Tam Quang discusses the ‘conspiracy’ by Lê Đình Kình and his sons.”)
“Mr Chức told me to light the fire. He said just to push them forward real hard, so I did push them forward. Then as I walked downstairs, I saw Mr Chức pour gasonline down, 3 or 5 times. And I heard screams from below. I knew there were cadres down there. And I heard Mr Chức say: Die, you pigs.”
Convincing? Let’s take this apart slowly. First, Mr Chức told Doanh to light the fire. After he had lit the fire Doanh went downstairs, Mr Chức stayed back to pour gasoline down the vent hole. Which means Mr Chức stood at the top and poured gasoline into a burning fire. What would have happened? Even a kid would be able to tell you. The fire from below would catch the fuel being poured down and make its way upward to the canister that Mr Chức was holding, burning the canister in the process. Mr Chức would be surrounded by fire. But that’s OK. According to Doanh’s confession, Mr Chức continued to pour gasoline down 2 to 4 more times. By then the fire around Mr Chức would have been tremendous. Yet in the end Mr Chức still survived all that so he could be captured by police and charged with killing three men in the act of “carrying out official duties”. Surprised?
It is clear that the story Doanh was forced to confess is both illogical and dumb. And yet VTV aired it over and over again. And all the newspapers kept repeating it. And, even more sadly, many people actually bought it.
But why did Doanh admit to something so illogical and dumb, and also harmful to himself, like that? Look at how he can barely walk straight while trying to act out the scene; he had to have the help of two policemen holding him up (see photo 29). Through that we can see the consequences of forced confession. It wouldn’t be unimaginable that, in such circumstance, had Doanh been told to admit to killing John F. Kennedy he probably would have done so.
What’s even more concerning is that, after Doanh made that confession, the odds of staying alive for Mr Chức were substantially reduced. Because if he’s kept alive and denies Doanh’s statement in a trial, it would be difficult to tidy up this play.
In summary, from Clause #1 to Clause #4 we can conclude that: the villagers at Đồng Tâm were neither directly nor indirectly responsible for the deaths of the three police officers. They did not do anything to cause the men to fall into the vent hole. And they never poured gasonline to burn them like the police accused them of doing.
From Clause 2 and 3, and the arguments proving Clause #4, we conclude: Someone killed the three officers and threw them into that pit. Two bodies were thrown in first and burned initially. Then the third body was thrown in after some amount of the fuel had burned off. The fuel used was not in liquid form (like petrol) but some kind of powerful substance of a powder or solid nature.
If the villagers could not have come close to the three officers who were fully armed, then where could the killer have come from if not from among the attackers?
To arrive at these conclusions I have purposefully presented two different arguments for Clause #1, #2 and #4. It’s not because I wanted to make a long argument, but because I wanted to make sure that if one argument is not sufficiently convincing or has some holes in it, then there’s still another way to prove the case. I had to be extra cautious and certain, because conscience demands that we not only must do justice for the dead, we also must protect the lives of those who are being wrongly accused and imprisoned.
That the police had to present a confession from Nguyễn văn Tuyển, that “Mr Kình instructed me to kill 3 guys and the rest will run away”, is utterly unconvincing. Contrariwise, it only increased the level of doubt: the number of “3 dead” was not a matter of chance but was predetermined from the time the plan was drawn up.
I probably could end here, because the highest purpose of this exposition is not to determine who the killer was, but to exonerate Citizen Kình and the imprisoned villagers of Đồng Tâm who will have to stand trial, so that they won’t be wrongly accused. It also should help the authorities in their investigation so that the innocent are not punished. What’s more, it seeks to warn those who have put too much trust in the state-run media, asking them to calmly reflect on what happened and stop making offensive remarks about the innocent victims.
Determining who gave the order and who carried out the murderous act is the job of those who are responsible for investigating this matter and who truly want to get to the bottom of this. Until credible results emerge, everyone will continue to have their own opinions.
During the investigation, every possible scenario needs to be examined. The following questions in particular are crucial:
- Who was X? Was X still alive when Y and Z were being incinerated? If X was already dead, then why did the perpetrator not thrown him in at the same time with Y and Z but waited until much of the fuel had burned off, leaving traces of an unfinished job? And if X was still alive, what did he do while Y and Z were killed and burned?
- Was an autopsy done on X? If the answer is Yes, was there any evidence that X was killed before being thrown into the pit? If no autopsy was done, why not? If the police knew full well how Mr Kình died and yet they still split his body open, why not do the same to X? Did somebody obstruct or not order such an autopsy on X?
- Who decided to create this three-man team of Thịnh, Quân and Huy? Who ordered firefighter Huy to join this team?
In an article on Vietnamnet titled “The sorrowful funerals of 3 soldiers killed at Đồng Tâm”, there’s this: “Nguyễn Huy Thịnh’s mother said that after the ceremony, her son’s body will be cremated and sent back to his hometown of Cổ Bi, Gia Lâm.”
Could that be a signal that X was Nguyễn Huy Thịnh? Because if Thịnh was Y or Z then there would have been no need for cremation.
-end of Part II
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